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Abstract
The sense of agency is typically defined as the experience of controlling one’s own actions, and through them, changes in
the external environment. It is often assumed that this experience is a single, unified construct that can be experimentally
manipulated and measured in a variety of ways. In this article, we challenge this assumption. We argue that we should ac-
knowledge four possible agency-related psychological constructs. Having a clear grasp of the possible constructs is impor-
tant since experimental procedures are only able to target some but not all the possible constructs. The unacknowledged
misalignment of the possible constructs of a sense of agency and the experimental procedures is a major theoretical and
methodological obstacle to studying the sense of agency. Only if we recognize the nature of this obstacle will we be able to
design the experimental paradigms that would enable us to study the responsible computational mechanisms.
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Introduction
The sense of agency is typically defined as the experience of
controlling one’s own actions, and through them, changes in
the external environment. It is often assumed that this experi-
ence is a single, unified construct that can be experimentally
manipulated and measured in a variety of ways. In this article,
we challenge this assumption. We provide conceptual and ex-
perimental reasons for the claim that studies of the sense of
agency have been studying a number of different agency-
related phenomena.
Recent research conceives of the conscious sense of agency
as grounded in the mechanisms of action control, ranging from
early mechanisms of action selection to later mechanisms of
evaluation (Haggard and Chambon 2012). Supporting this con-
ception, some studies have reported that a reduced sense of
agency is related to a reduced fluency of action selection
(Wenke et al. 2010; Chambon et al. 2014), whereas others have
reported that binding between actions and effects are related to
judgements of agency (Schwarz et al. 2018a). One central as-
sumption for this conception of the sense of agency and the un-
derlying action–control mechanisms is that the various stages
of the process of action–control contribute to a single and uni-
fied sense of agency.
This conception is challenged by a growing number of stud-
ies reporting a lack of correlation between measures supposed
to gauge different aspects of one single construct: the sense of
agency. For instance, some studies correlating separate meas-
ures supposed to track sensorimotor predictions of action-
effects (intentional binding and sensory attenuation) have not
been able to find any significant relation (Dewey and Knoblich
2014; Borhani et al. 2017). Moreover, these implicit measures
have turned out not to be correlated with explicit measures of
the sense of agency (Schwarz et al. 2019). Assuming that these
experimental procedures study different but tightly related
aspects of the action–control mechanism underlying a unified
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experience of agency, we should expect significant correlations
between the measures (Beck et al. 2017).
In this article, we argue that the sense of agency is no single
construct. Instead, we argue that we should acknowledge four
possible psychological constructs. This part of the argument is
conceptual. Having a clear grasp of the possible constructs is
important since experimental procedures are only able to target
some but not all the possible constructs. The unacknowledged
misalignment of the possible constructs of a sense of agency
and the experimental procedures is a major theoretical and
methodological obstacle to studying the sense of agency. Only if
we recognize the nature of this obstacle will we be able to de-
sign the experimental paradigms that would enable us to study
the responsible computational mechanisms.
We proceed as follows. In Four senses of agency, we argue
that a cognitive neuroscience of the sense of agency should dis-
tinguish between, on the one hand, ability and phenomenal
character forms of sense of agency, and, on the other hand,
bodily and external forms of sense of agency. The two distinc-
tions combine to define four different psychological constructs.
In the section Sense of agency procedures, we argue that the
conceptual distinctions are mirrored in distinctions between ex-
perimental procedures. Some psychological measures target a
sense of agency as a cognitive ability, whereas others target it
as a phenomenal character. Some experimental manipulations
target a bodily sense of agency, whereas others target an exter-
nal sense of agency. These constraints are rarely acknowledged
in the experimental literature. In the section Measuring the
phenomenal character of the sense of agency, we argue that
due to the nature of action tasks, there are reasons for suspect-
ing that current procedures are not able to systematically study
a sense of agency as a phenomenal character. In Construct va-
lidity, we argue that the unacknowledged misalignment of a
plurality of constructs and the standard experimental para-
digms leads to a general low construct validity of sense of
agency studies. One consequence is that too often we remain
unable to determine exactly what psychological phenomenon
an experimental procedure is really targeting.
Four Senses of Agency
In this section, we argue that the standard use of the notion of a
sense of agency in cognitive neuroscience is ambiguous be-
tween four different possible constructs (ability vs phenomenal
feel and bodily vs external, see Fig. 1A). As long as studies do
not specify which construct they are targeting, the experimental
procedures will be threatened by low construct validity (see
Construct validity section).
Ability sense of agency vs phenomenal character sense
of agency
Often, researchers do not notice that there are important differ-
ences between conceiving of a sense of agency as a cognitive
ability or as a distinctive phenomenal character. The sense of
agency as an ability can be considered as a cognitive function
that enables us to answer the question of ‘who’ is the agent of
an action or who is the cause of an event. Sense of agency as a
phenomenal character has to do with what it is like to control
one’s action, and through it, events in the world. This concep-
tual distinction is an instance of a general distinction between
conceiving a consciousness as a cognitive function or as a non-
cognitive phenomenal character. This general distinction mani-
fests itself in an important theoretical conundrum.
Theoretically, it seems impossible to define phenomenal con-
sciousness as a set of well-specified functional roles, but, meth-
odologically, it seems equally impossible to experimentally
study phenomenal consciousness without assuming that it
plays some causal role.
In philosophy, this problem has been well known since
Block’s discussion of the troubles with functionalism (Block
1978). Consider some functionalist definition of consciousness.
A mental state is conscious if and only if the state plays the
causal role x in the cognitive system (for instance, the informa-
tional state has been funnelled into working memory by atten-
tional mechanisms, Prinz 2005). Now, for any causal functional
characterization that specifies the conditions for consciousness,
we can imagine some physical system (for instance, a very big
group of people where the members are connected to each
other by ‘walkie-talkies’) that realizes the causal function but
where we can agree the system is not conscious. Consequently,
having a cognitive function is not sufficient for consciousness.
But neither is it necessary. That is, we cannot rule out the possi-
ble existence of conscious creatures in which the conscious
state does not satisfy the functional description (Block 1995).
One worry against this kind of argument is that it pushes us to
accept that consciousness plays no representational and func-
tional role in human psychology. This looks suspiciously like
epiphenomenalism about consciousness (Dennett 1988).
In psychological science, we witness a similar dialectic be-
tween cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness.
Some psychologists define consciousness in terms of functional
role. Let us focus on the association of consciousness with the
functional role of attention. A cognitive theory of consciousness
will typically defend the claim that attention is necessary for
consciousness (Jacoby et al. 1997; De Brigard and Prinz 2010) and
that consciousness is necessary for a number of cognitive oper-
ations (for instance, for explicit information maintenance, se-
mantic processing, flexible and novel combinations of cognitive
operations, or spontaneous initiation of intentional action,
McGovern and Baars 2007; Dehaene 2014).
Against such functional characterizations, it seems never
too difficult to design some experiment that can demonstrate
versions of the cognitive function (say, attention or working
memory) in the absence of consciousness (Kentridge et al. 1999;
Soto et al. 2011). Furthermore, there are introspective reasons
for accepting that consciousness ‘overflows’ the scope of atten-
tion, working memory and reportability (Block 2011). The non-
cognitive conclusion is that attention and working memory are
neither sufficient nor necessary for consciousness. Similar to
the philosophical discussions, one might worry that the non-
cognitive conclusion has the consequence that consciousness
becomes impossible to study. To study consciousness in psy-
chological experiment, we need to assume that it plays some
systematic causal role (Kouider et al. 2010; Overgaard and
Gru¨nbaum 2012; Phillips 2018).
Summing up, when studying consciousness, we need to de-
cide whether or not we conceive of consciousness as playing a
cognitive role. If we identify consciousness with some cognitive
function, the problem is that it always seems possible to find
instances of the function in the absence of consciousness. If we
insist that consciousness is something other than possible cog-
nitive functions, the problem is that consciousness seems epi-
phenomenal and impossible to study systematically.
One reason why this conceptual choice is so important in
cognitive psychology is that it aligns with a choice of experi-
mental paradigms. If one associate consciousness with a spe-
cific set of cognitive functions, one can study consciousness by
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studying the cognitive functions (using the traditional measures
of response time and accuracy). If one conceives of conscious-
ness in non-cognitive terms, one will usually use paradigms
with introspective reports and implicit neural measures. Note
that introspective reports are here assumed to express or report
on the phenomenal character of an experience (for instance,
the sharpness of one’s pain), where one’s introspective report-
ing might be by verbal or some other communicative means.
Note also that not all verbal reports are introspective reports.
For instance, a verbal report of the number of items in a display
will usually not count as an introspective report.
With respect to the sense of agency, we find a similar split
between conceptualizing the experience in terms of a cognitive
function (ability) or as a non-cognitive phenomenal character.
Notice that the conceptual distinction between conceiving of a
sense of agency as a cognitive ability or as a non-cognitive phe-
nomenal character is orthogonal to the distinction between a
low-level sense of agency as an experience and a high-level
judgement of agency (Synofzik et al. 2008). Irrespective of
whether one conceives of a sense of agency as a cognitive ability
or phenomenal character, one can make the distinction be-
tween sense of agency and judgements of agency.
Focusing first on the sense of agency as a cognitive ability, one
motivation for studying the sense of agency has been the identi-
fication of the sense of agency with the agent’s ability to recog-
nize her own movements. One important hypothesis has been
that this ability to identify oneself rests upon the ability to as-
sign the correct agent to a movement, i.e., that oneself is the
agent of the movement as opposed to the movement being an-
other agent’s action (Georgieff and Jeannerod 1998; Jeannerod
2006). Perhaps the most basic form of action–recognition is a
kind of sensorimotor identification in which predictions of sen-
sory consequences of a movement are confirmed by sensory
feedback (for instance, proprioceptive, tactile, and visual feed-
back). This kind of sensorimotor identification has been studied
by looking at automatic compensatory movements in versions
of the Nielsen paradigm (see Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998, for
discussion of the paradigm, see below).
Identifying the conscious sense of agency with a basic sen-
sorimotor ability to make self-other discrimination can in some
situations seem problematic. It seems that the function of
sensorimotor-based self-identification is conceptually indepen-
dent of a conscious sense of agency. First, plausibly, agents are
able to discriminate their own movements in the absence of
conscious awareness. In other words, we can have action iden-
tification without a conscious sense of agency (as argued by
Jeannerod 2009). Second, we can also have a conscious sense of
agency without sensorimotor-based action identification. At
least it is not obvious that the type of situation where cortical
stimulation is supposed to induce a conscious agency-like expe-
rience associated with movement (for instance, Desmurget et al.
2009) is a situation where action identification is computation-
ally required. In short, just as an in the studies of conscious-
ness, there are instances of the cognitive operation in the
absence of a conscious sense of agency and possibly also instan-
ces of a conscious sense of agency in the absence of the cognitive
operation. In other words, the cognitive ability (for instance,
sensorimotor-based action identification) seems to be neither
necessary nor sufficient to the conscious sense of agency.
Turning now to the other side of the conceptual split. A
number of researchers understand the sense of agency not as a
particular kind of cognitive ability but as a specific type of phe-
nomenal feel. According to this view, we should identify the
sense of agency by how it feels (not by what it does). For in-
stance, one might define the sense of agency as ‘a definite back-
ground feeling or buzz of being in control’ (Ku¨hn et al. 2013, p.
1936). Instead of defining a sense of agency as something the
agent can do or operations the system can perform, it is defined
as a distinctive feeling or phenomenal character produced by
certain neural mechanisms. Often, this phenomenal character
sense of agency has been tied to comparator mechanisms as-
sumed to be crucial to motor control (Haggard and Chambon
2012).
Identifying the conscious sense of agency with a non-
cognitive phenomenal character can also seem problematic in
some situations. To begin, studying the phenomenal sense of
agency in behavioural experiments presupposes that the sense
of agency plays some systematic causal role in generating the
behaviour identified as the dependent variable. Some research-
ers think that the phenomenal character of sense of agency
Figure 1. (A) The 2-by-2 construct of sense of agency: phenomenal character vs ability and bodily vs external. (B) Division of experimental proce-
dures into bodily or external sense of agency by asking whether the procedures manipulate properties of the movement or properties of the ex-
ternal event. Division of experimental procedures into phenomenal or ability sense of agency by asking whether they use a subjective scale or
performance accuracy as a measure. We provide examples of the different experimental studies, categorized into the four different constructs.
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plays only a minimal causal role in generating introspective
reports (and hence as inputs to belief formation, see, for in-
stance, Wegner 2002), whereas others think a phenomenal
sense of agency plays a more substantial role in motor cognition
(Haggard 2017).
One way to characterize the phenomenal sense of agency as
playing a more substantial causal role is to associate the phe-
nomenal character with the output of certain neural compara-
tor mechanisms hypothesized to be central to motor control.
However, tying the phenomenal sense to this kind of mecha-
nism does not help us understand the causal role played by the
phenomenal sense of agency. Whatever functional role the
comparator mechanism is playing for motor control and action
identification, it is not hard to imagine that it can play this role
without producing any conscious sense of agency
(Zaadnoordijk et al. 2019). Furthermore, the comparator’s
matching of predicted and actual feedback is often thought to
work by subtraction. A complete match means that the predic-
tion cancels out the actual sensory feedback. The result should
be the cancelling or dampening down of signals (not the pro-
duction of positive signals) (for a discussion of this point,
Christensen and Gru¨nbaum 2017). Given the absence of a func-
tional role for the phenomenally conscious sense of agency, it
becomes problematic how we should measure it.
Summing up this part, researchers have to make a choice be-
tween conceiving of the conscious sense of agency as a cogni-
tive ability or a distinctive non-cognitive phenomenal
character. This choice is an instance of a more general choice
between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness.
As an instance of this more general choice, the ability view and
the phenomenal character view are each confronted with a set
of problems—in so far as these views are understood as exhaus-
tive definitions of a conscious sense of agency. In the domain of
motor control and sense of agency, this choice has important
methodological consequences. If you opt for an ability view,
then various action recognition paradigms will be the standard
choice of experimental paradigms. If you adopt a phenomenal
feel view, then various introspective paradigms might seem
more appealing (paradigms where participants are asked to as-
sess the strength of their sense or feeling of agency). We will re-
turn to the experimental paradigms below.
Bodily sense of agency vs external sense of agency
The above distinction can be combined with a distinction be-
tween bodily and external conceptions of the sense of agency
(Christensen and Gru¨nbaum 2017, 2018; Solfo and van Leeuwen
2018; Wen 2019—see Fig. 1A). According to a bodily conception,
the sense of agency is related to the performance of specific
bodily movements, whereas according to an external concep-
tion, the sense of agency is associated with the planned envi-
ronmental consequences of one’s action. Thus, some
researchers define the sense of agency in relation to move-
ments (for instance, Christensen and Gru¨nbaum 2018, p. 37:
‘[participants] report whether they themselves had performed a
movement of the index finger’.). Some researchers emphasize
the control of external events (for instance, Wen et al. 2016, p. 1:
‘The ubiquitous experience of a subjective feeling of control
over the outcome of events through one’s behaviour refers to
sense of agency’.). Most often, however, researchers mention
the sense of agency without any consideration of the distinction
between bodily and external characterizations (for instance,
Haggard 2017).
Disregarding the distinction between bodily and external
conceptions of the sense of agency is problematic for a number
of reasons. The ability and phenomenal feel conceptions each
come in bodily and external versions. The bodily version of the
ability view is assumed by Blakemore (2003). According to
Blakemore, the sense of agency is the ability to identify a move-
ment as being self-produced. By contrast, Fourneret and
Jeannerod (1998) assume the external version of the ability
view. According to these researchers, the sense of agency has to
do with the ability to recognize consequences of one’s move-
ments as being caused by oneself. The bodily version of the phe-
nomenal feel view is assumed by Bayne (2011). Here, the focus
is on the distinctive feeling of movement activity. Finally, some
researchers adopt an external version of the phenomenal char-
acter view according to which a distinctive feeling of agency is
associated with planned consequences of one’s action. This
conception is adopted by Haggard and Tsakiris (2009) and Ku¨hn
et al. (2013).
There are reasons for thinking that bodily and external
forms of sense of agency are realized by different mechanisms,
even if these mechanisms are governed by the same type of pre-
dictive comparator principles. First, if we assume that the sense
of agency is best explained by a comparator model (for a review,
see Christensen and Gru¨nbaum 2018), then we should distin-
guish between the mechanisms for bodily and external sense of
agency. The comparator mechanism might be a plausible expla-
nation of a bodily sense of agency. That is, one plausible expla-
nation of the bodily sense of agency is to describe it as the
output of a neural comparator mechanism that takes as input
sensory predictions computed from motor commands and sen-
sory feedback from the actual performance produced by the
motor commands.
The same comparator mechanism is not a plausible expla-
nation of an external sense of agency. One of the reasons for this
is that if we compare the external consequences with the move-
ments that produce them, the external consequences are usu-
ally delayed or mediated through some tool, device or
apparatus. Predicting external consequences requires that
knowledge about the delays and mediators can be incorporated
into the comparator model. If I turn the key in my car, it takes a
little while before the engine starts. In order to make the predic-
tion that my movement (rotating my hand) will make the en-
gine hum (i.e. start the engine), beliefs about how an engine
works or prior experience with this type of action are required.
Similarly, predictions about auditory events as a consequence
of a button press build on prior beliefs about the relevant devi-
ces and their delays. It is a plausible assumption that a system
using copies of motor commands to compute predictions of in-
ternal sensory feedback is relatively cognitively insulated and
modular, with a relatively fixed knowledge base of associations
between motor signals and proprioceptive sensory consequen-
ces. It is much less plausible that the same could be said of a
system that computes predictions of external sensory events. It
is unlikely that the same mechanism computing a prediction of
somatosensory and proprioceptive feedback from copies of mo-
tor signals is also able to predict the auditory event of the hum-
ming engine.
So, while it is likely that the same type of computational
principle can support both types of prediction, it seems unlikely
that they are realized by the same computational mechanisms.
Both the computational mechanism involved in predicting pro-
prioceptive sensations of movements and the computational
mechanism involved in predicting perceived events in the
world beyond the body might be governed by the same
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predictive or Bayesian principles, but they would compute over
different types of input. One comparator mechanism produces
predictions of proprioceptive sensations on the basis of motor
commands, whereas the other comparator mechanism predicts
perception of distal events on the basis of many types of infor-
mation. Furthermore, one can assume that these predictive
mechanisms rely on different types of learned associations, as
well as different types of associative strength. This kind of dif-
ference between a comparator mechanism for movement and
for distal effects has been confirmed by a recent fMRI study by
Uhlmann et al. (2020) indicating that recognition of one’s own
hand rely on information specifying hand identity. Prior estab-
lishment of hand identity is not needed when the brain com-
putes a sense of agency for the movement.
Second, if we assume that the sense of agency is best
explained by motor commands or efferent signals alone
(Tsakiris and Haggard 2005; Christensen and Gru¨nbaum 2018),
we are again forced to distinguish between the mechanisms for
bodily and external sense of agency. Motor commands might
explain a bodily sense of agency related to particular move-
ments but it is difficult to see how they could explain an exter-
nal sense of agency for the events brought about by one’s
movement. To explain the external sense, we would have to in-
clude other sources of information as well. Taken together, this
gives us good reasons to assume a difference between a bodily
and an external sense of agency.
It could be objected that the distinction between bodily and
external sense of agency is arbitrary. One could have pointed to
different aspects of the experience of voluntary movement. For
instance, a number of philosophers have pointed to experiences
such as the sense of initiation, feeling of effort, sense of purpo-
siveness, and sense of goal-completion (see Horgan et al. 2003;
Bayne 2008; Pacherie 2008). One might claim that since these
features are just as important—if not more important to our un-
derstanding of agency—as the distinction between a bodily and
external sense of agency, and they cut across our distinction,
our distinction seems arbitrary or unmotivated.
The philosophical literature has undoubtedly unearthed
many important dimensions of conscious agency. Our concern
has, however, not been to provide a conceptual or phenomeno-
logically satisfying description of the conscious aspects of in-
tentional agency. Our main aim has been to describe a few
salient distinctions grounded in mechanistic knowledge and
their fit with experimental practise (see Sense of agency proce-
dures section). A distinction like the one between sense of initi-
ation and sense of completion might be interesting but it does
not, to our knowledge, fit with a distinction between types of
experimental paradigms.
This gives us a conceptual two-by-two structure (see Fig. 1A).
Conceptually, abilities and phenomenal character are two dis-
tinct kinds of attribute, and so are external and bodily forms of
the sense of agency. Plausibly, these two conceptual distinc-
tions carve out four possible psychological attributes: external
vs bodily sense of agency as an ability and external vs bodily
sense of agency as a phenomenal feel. These distinctions are
important. Cognitive neuroscientists studying the sense of
agency tend to be oblivious of the fact that the notion of the
sense of agency is ambiguous with respect to four possible
attributes.
Sense of Agency Procedures
The two conceptual distinctions and their four combinations
are important because of how they connect with experimental
procedures. On the one hand, whether an experimental proce-
dure studies a bodily or an external sense of agency depends on
the experimental manipulation. Roughly, if the paradigm
manipulates the bodily movement, it is targeting a bodily sense
of agency; whereas if the paradigm manipulates an external
event, it is targeting an external sense of agency. On the other
hand, whether a procedure studies an ability or a phenomenal
character sense of agency depends on the type of measure.
Roughly, if it makes sense to use accuracy as a measure, the
paradigm is targeting an ability sense of agency; whereas if the
paradigm uses an introspective measurement scale or an im-
plicit measure (intentional binding or sensory attenuation), it is
targeting a phenomenal character sense of agency. This is a
rough generalization. The experimental reality is bound to be
more complex with possible borderline cases, hybrid situations
and exceptions. Let us illustrate this classification with a few
paradigmatic experimental studies.
External1 ability sense of agency
Experimental paradigms fall into this category if they work by
manipulating external events and measuring accuracy. There
are broadly speaking two types of experimental designs used to
study the external sense of agency conceived as a cognitive abil-
ity: feedback manipulation studies and action–effect studies.
First, some studies have used a general design where the on-
going sensory feedback signal (typically visual) is manipulated.
A prototypical example is computerized version of the alien
hand experiment (Nielsen 1963) by Fourneret and Jeannerod
(1998). In this experiment, line drawing movements are trans-
formed into a visually distorted version of the same line draw-
ing movement. The distortions of visual feedback can either be
of a spatial or temporal nature, i.e., angular deviations or delays
(Farrer et al. 2008). A typical measure would be participants’ ac-
curacy in determining deviations between their own movement
and the visible line drawing.
Second, some studies have used a design where participants
perform an action that produces some event (an action-effect
design). Most action-effect studies are combined with a subjec-
tive scale measure (see External þ phenomenal character sense
of agency section) but a few have used accuracy and response
time measures. For instance, in a study by Spengler et al. (2009),
participants initially had to press one of two buttons with their
index or middle finger related to a subsequent appearance of a
red or blue square, whereby they learned the association be-
tween an action and its effect. In the real experiment, a com-
puter controlled the outcome and the participant had to
evaluate whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement
that they produced the square.
External1 phenomenal character sense of agency
In this category, we find studies that manipulate an external
event while gauging the phenomenal sense of agency by some
kind of subjective scale of agency or an implicit measure
thought to reliably index the phenomenal sense. Often, these
types of paradigm do not easily allow for any assessment of cor-
rectness according to some objective behavioural standard. As
above, we can divide studies into feedback manipulation stud-
ies or action-effect studies. Let us just mention one typical
study of each subcategory.
A typical design combining manipulation of visual feedback
and subjective ratings is provided by Nahab et al. (2011). Here,
the participants wore a cyber-glove over their hand. They were
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presented with a computerized version of the hand’s move-
ments, which could be manipulated to different degrees. At the
completion of each block, the participants were asked to ‘report
the level of control experienced over the simulated hand, rating
anywhere from 0% (no control) to 100% (full control)’.
As an example of a study combining the manipulation of
action-effects with introspective ratings, consider a now-classic
paradigm introduced by Sato and Yasuda (2005), in which par-
ticipants first learned an association between two actions (press
of a button with their left or right hand) and two effects (600 or
1000 Hz tones) following the actions immediately. In the test
phase, participants were pressing the two buttons and subse-
quently hearing tones, but the tone could be either the same as
(congruent) or different (incongruent) than the tone they had
learned in training normally follows the button press. Also, the
tone could follow the action immediately, as participants
learned it normally does, or after a delay (200, 400 or 600 ms).
Participants were informed that on some trials the experi-
menter would produce the tone, although this was not true.
After each trial (button press and a tone), participants were
asked to answer two questions on a scale from 0 (‘totally dis-
agree’) to 100 (‘totally agree’): ‘I was the one who produced the
tone’ (supposed to measure the ‘sense of self-agency’) (we dis-
cuss a different type of action-effect paradigm in Transparency
of agency task section). (Note that the sentence ‘I was the one
who produced the tone’ is ambiguous between an ‘ability read-
ing’ according to which it is a judgement about the causal origin
of the tone (can be assessed for correctness) or a ‘phenomenal
character reading’ according to which it is a judgement about
the strength of an inner experience (cannot be assessed for cor-
rectness). Sato and Yasuda (2005) presumably intend the latter
introspective reading.)
Worries about the inter-trial reliability of subjective ratings
have led researchers to search for some implicit measure of the
phenomenal sense of agency. One of the most influential series
of action-effect studies is an implicit version of the design
(Haggard et al. 2002; Moore and Obhi 2012; Wolpe and Rowe
2014). In the operant condition, participants have to perform
actions (a button press) that causes an auditory tone to appear
after a 250 ms interval. Participants perform a temporal judge-
ment (using a rotating Libet clock) of when they performed the
action or when they heard the tone. These judgements are com-
pared with control situations with temporal judgement of the
action or the tone separately. The apparent temporal attraction
of the judged time of the action and the judged time of the effect
is the so-called intentional binding effect, because it seems to
appear only when the action is voluntarily produced (Haggard
et al. 2002).
The temporal binding phenomenon is often assumed to be
an implicit measure of sense of agency (Moore and Obhi 2012).
In some experiments, a direct estimation of the temporal inter-
val is also used (Dewey and Knoblich 2014; Imaizumi and Tanno
2019). Recent data suggest that the binding effect is mainly
driven by predictability of the action-effect events (Kirsch et al.
2019). These data suggest that the binding is also present in the
case of involuntary actions-effect relations that are predictable,
indicating that the binding effect is a general phenomenon as-
cribed to causal inference rather than a matter of intentionality
(Buehner 2012).
It remains unclear what the binding studies are actually
measuring in relation to explicit measures of agency. The ma-
nipulation of the interval between the action and the effect pro-
duces systematic variations in explicit judgements of agency
(Schwarz et al. 2019), but the effect on implicit measures of
agency is more mixed, with some studies suggesting that the in-
tentional binding effect increases with delay (Humphreys and
Buehner 2009; Ku¨hn et al. 2013; Dewey and Knoblich 2014; Wen
et al. 2015; Ruess et al. 2017) and others suggesting it decreases
(Ruess et al. 2018). Recently, a number of studies have investi-
gated this relationship between explicit and implicit measures
of agency (Imaizumi and Tanno 2019; Schwarz et al. 2019) with
varying results. We return to this issue in Construct validity
section.
In conclusion, to study the external phenomenal sense of
agency, researchers use either paradigms with an introspective
measure or paradigms with an implicit measure (mainly inten-
tional binding). Both types of paradigm are confronted with im-
portant problems. As will become clearer in Measuring the
phenomenal character of the sense of agency section, for both
types of measures, it turns out to be difficult to establish that
they are really measuring a distinctive phenomenal sense of
agency.
Bodily1 ability sense of agency
Studies in this category combine the manipulation of the bodily
movement with some kind of accuracy measure. Though diffi-
cult to study, the sense of agency in the bodily ability sense is
easier to manipulate and measure than the bodily phenomenal
sense of agency. In principle, the bodily ability sense of agency
can be studied by manipulating whether or not a participant’s
movement is voluntary, while measuring the participant’s abil-
ity to discriminate between the voluntary and the involuntary
movement conditions. Important to the success of this type of
paradigm is the assumption that movements in voluntary and
involuntary conditions can be similar with respect to their kine-
matic and sensory properties. Only few researchers have pur-
sued this line of research. Here we will describe some possible
experimental designs.
First, take a recent study by Christensen and Gru¨nbaum
(2018) using a mechanical device to make passive finger exten-
sion movements. This allowed the authors to make compari-
sons of voluntary finger extension movements and passive
movements of the same fingers. By creating choice conditions
that leave some room open for errors in performance, it is possi-
ble to create situations where it becomes ambiguous for the par-
ticipant whether she performed a movement or the mechanical
device moved her finger. These two different types of event can
be objectively measured by the presence or absence of bursts of
muscle activity of the finger extensor muscles using electromy-
ography (EMG). Christensen and Gru¨nbaum (2018) used a stan-
dard timing and velocity of the mechanical hand, which
matched average reaction times found in pilot experiment. An
obvious improvement to their study would be to use EMG-
triggered mechanical perturbations with a minimal delay and
dynamics that match the individual participant’s movement.
Another possible approach to study objectively the ability di-
mension of bodily sense of agency is to use functional electrical
stimulation (Merletti et al. 1975; Popovic et al. 2002; Christensen
and Grey 2013). Here, patterned electrical stimulation of the
muscles can be used to augment voluntary movements, or pas-
sively activate muscle synergies to make your limbs move with-
out voluntarily making the movements. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to induce movements using functional electrical stimu-
lation without the accompanying clear sensation in the skin of
a weak electrical stimulus. A matched sensation of electrical
stimuli to the skin during a voluntary movement is unfortu-
nately very hard to make without inducing movements. The
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different sensation of different stimulation intensities is obvi-
ous to the participant. Therefore, it is challenging, though per-
haps not impossible, to use functional electrical stimulation to
directly study the ability dimension of bodily sense of agency.
A third approach that has been used in some studies is to
compare voluntary movements with transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) induced muscle twitches (see Tsakiris and
Haggard 2003; Jensen et al. 2014). This also allows for objective
measures to compare with judgments of whether it is oneself or
the stimulation that induces the movement. Unfortunately, the
muscle activity patterns underlying voluntary movements
(even for simple finger flexion or extension movements) are
very different from the motor evoked potential twitches in-
duced with TMS, which has a distinct temporally locked pattern
of EMG activity. Even series or trains of TMS pulses are distin-
guishable from voluntary activity (Christensen et al. 2010).
The main objective for developing these procedures in rela-
tion to the bodily sense of agency studies is that they allow for
almost comparable situations where the ability to make self-
other distinctions are important. Common to all three types of
experimental procedures is that they rely on movement behav-
iours where the movement is simple, but the task is relatively
difficult and introduces errors in behaviour that can lead to am-
biguous situations where the participant can be in doubt as to
whether a voluntary movement or externally induced move-
ment is made. The procedures involve tasks that are objective
in the sense that voluntary vs involuntary can be measured ob-
jectively. Furthermore, the procedures are transparent in the
sense that participants can easily understand what it means to
distinguish between voluntary or involuntary movements and
what it means to answer correctly on a single trial.
Bodily1 phenomenal character sense of agency
Only few studies purport to investigate directly the phenomenal
sense of agency associated with voluntary bodily movements.
We classify the existing studies by whether they use introspec-
tive or implicit measures.
First, consider neuroscientific evidence for the claim that the
performance of movements is associated with a distinctive ex-
perience of activity. A small body of experimental literature sug-
gests that there is a type of phenomenal feeling related to
movement. These studies have used either direct electrical cor-
tical stimulation during surgery in tumour or epilepsy patients
(Fried et al. 1991; Desmurget et al., 2009; Fornia et al., 2020) or in-
direct cortical stimulation in healthy participants using TMS to
induce experiences of movement without accompanying move-
ments of the body (Amassian et al. 1989; Christensen et al.,
2010). These experiments indicate that participants either expe-
rience a sensation of movement or they experience an urge to
move a body part akin to a voluntary experience of moving a
body part. In addition, it has previously been shown that partici-
pants can discriminate between the experience of motor com-
mands, on the one hand, and somatosensory and
proprioceptive feedback, on the other hand (McCloskey et al.,
1983) during a voluntary movement. It remains unclear how to
understand these experiences and introspective reports. As in
the discussions of the Libet paradigm, it remains unclear what
participants are actually reporting (for a recent review of the
problems with the Libet paradigm, see Brass et al. 2019).
Second, sensory attenuation is often taken as an implicit
measure of the phenomenal sense of agency related to move-
ment. In sensory attenuation experiments, the sensory conse-
quences of a movement are diminished when the movement is
voluntarily performed. This link to voluntary movement has
motivated the use of sensory attenuation as an implicit mea-
sure of the sense of agency. The sensory attenuation phenome-
non has been shown in humans with tickling sensations
(Blakemore et al. 1998, 2000) and force escalation (Shergill et al.
2003). For a number of reasons, the use of sensory attenuation
to study the sense of agency is problematic. The basic problem
is that it remains unknown what exactly is measured by mea-
suring sensory attenuation.
Mechanisms for sensory attenuation were first introduced
into the physiological literature to explain how an organism is
able to distinguish between retinal changes caused by changes
in the world or by movements of the eye (Sperry 1950). One early
explanation of this ability was the assumption of a comparator
mechanism. Only by the later theoretical assumption that the
comparator mechanisms might explain the sense of agency (for
instance, Frith 2015; Daprati et al. 1997; Haggard 2005—for a his-
torical review of comparator models, see Christensen and
Gru¨nbaum 2018) has the link between sensory attenuation and
sense of agency been proposed. As long as the link between
comparator mechanisms and a sense of agency is unclear, the
link between sensory attenuation and a sense of agency
remains equally unclear. It is very likely that sensory attenua-
tion is much broader physiological principle, as the early mod-
els of eye movement suggested.
It is worth noting that sensory attenuation procedures differ
with respect to their possible constructs—that is, with respect
to which attribute they target. Whereas the procedure used by
Blakemore et al. (1998) is more in line with the bodily sense of
agency (prediction of tactile sensation), the procedure employed
by Timm et al. (2016) would be more easily aligned with the ex-
ternal sense of agency (prediction of auditory event). That is, if
these attenuation procedures could be said to target a sense of
agency in the first place.
These uncertainties might be the reason why the few exist-
ing attempts to find correlations between sense of agency judg-
ments (in the external sense) and sensory attenuation [for
example, operationalized as N1 and P2 suppression measured
by electroencephalography, Gentsch and Schu¨tz-Bosbach 2011]
have been disappointing (Dewey and Knoblich 2014; Timm et al.
2016). One reason for these missing correlations might be that
sensory attenuation does not to depend on the self-aspect of a
motor action generating an event but captures the predictability
of these events irrespective of whether these are self-generated
(Kaiser and Schu¨tz-Bosbach 2018). Consequently, even if
researchers were to find some positive relation between the two
measures (i.e. explicit or implicit judgements and sensory at-
tenuation), it might be the case that the participants can cor-
rectly answer the question of whether they produced the effect,
on the basis of a general predictive ability, rather than because
of a dedicated sense of agency signal.
Interim conclusions
Most of the above-mentioned studies employ an experimental
approach where a movement elicits an external event. In some
cases, this event resembles a delayed version of the actual
movement performed using a delayed video signal (feedback
manipulation), in other cases, the event is a planned auditory
event (action-effect manipulation). These studies assume an ex-
ternal conception of the sense of agency. They manipulate the
agent’s ability to recognize planned environmental events as
self-produced or the agent’s degree of sense of control over
such events. Consequently, these designs confound the bodily
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and external constructs of sense of agency. That is, also on trials
where participants report a diminished sense of agency for the
external event, the participants are actively moving their hands
to press a button and should be expected to have a bodily sense
of agency for the movement. In conclusion, these experimental
paradigms cannot study the bodily sense of agency for move-
ments in absence of their external consequences.
If this brief review of the standard experimental procedures
for the study of the sense of agency gives us an adequate and
representative picture of the field, then experimental sense of
agency research is confronted with a problem. The vast major-
ity experimental of paradigms study either the external sense
of agency or they study sensory attenuation or intentional bind-
ing. Given the absence of correlations between the implicit and
the explicit measures of agency, it remains unclear what the
implicit measures are really measuring.
Measuring the Phenomenal Character of the
Sense of Agency
We have distinguished between ability and phenomenal char-
acter forms of the sense of agency in terms of whether studies
use accuracy or introspective scales as a measure. We now dis-
cuss an important methodological challenge to the use of sub-
jective measures of the phenomenal sense of agency. The
challenge is twofold. First, subjective ratings scales for the sense
of agency are difficult to relate to an objectively controlled stim-
ulus condition. This makes it difficult to interpret the different
steps or degrees of a subjective scale. Second, given the absence
of an unambiguous relation to an externally controlled stimulus
and an accuracy score, it becomes difficult for a participant to
interpret the experimental task. Our claim is that only if
researchers are able to address and overcome the two chal-
lenges can we be confident that procedures designed to mea-
sure the phenomenal sense of agency really do measure this
construct.
Objectivity of agency measures
The interpretation of experimental results depends on the in-
ternal validity of the experimental set-up. This in turn depends
on the experimenter’s ability to control for all relevant con-
founding factors—that is, extraneous factors that might influ-
ence the dependent variable. Trivial as it may sound, this is
particularly important when we are trying to measure the
strength of some internal signal by introspective reports. The
success of psychophysics largely depends on the possibility of
relating introspective judgements of the strength of an internal
signal (e.g. experienced weight) to the objective physical
strength of the stimulus (e.g. the actual weight). Subjective
measures in the perceptual domain can usually be related in
this way to objective features of the stimulus. This enables an
unambiguous interpretation of the subjective measurement
scale and allows researchers to control for other sources for the
judgement of the participant.
The action domain is different in the sense that the relevant
internal signals cannot be related in any straightforward way to
physical features of some external stimulus. Irrespective of
one’s favourite definition of voluntary movement, voluntary
actions are driven by internal signals or representations. The
organism’s behaviour is driven by internal goal representations
or motor commands computed on the basis of such representa-
tions—even in cases where the organism is voluntarily setting
itself up to react quickly to external cues. Relating a
phenomenal sense of agency to some external stimulus condi-
tion will therefore be a question of relating an internally gener-
ated signal to an external physical condition.
In the case of voluntary movement, features of the internal
signal are not related to features of a physical stimulus situation
in the same way that strength of the internal signal is related to
strength of a physical signal in the perceptual domain. Various
manipulations of delays, dislocation, and noise and jittering do
not relate to judgement of strength of the phenomenal sense of
agency in any unambiguous way that would allow researchers
to compute relations in the action domain equivalent to
Weber’s law in the perceptual domain (see Dong et al. 2015).
Consequently, if the sense of agency is crucially related to
the internally generated representations, then, independently
of one’s explanatory model of the sense of agency, the strength
of the sense of agency cannot be related in a straightforward
way to an external stimulus feature. Without an unambiguous
relation to some objectively controlled stimulus condition, it
remains unclear what different degrees on the subjective
agency scale means for an individual participant and for differ-
ent participants. This makes it difficult to interpret and validate
measurement scales for the strength of the phenomenal sense
of agency.
Transparency of agency task
If the crucial dependent variable in sense of agency studies is
the subjective measure of the strength of a participant’s phe-
nomenal sense of agency, then it becomes important how
transparent the task is to the participant. By this, we mean that
the point of the experimental task and the participants’ under-
standing of what they are supposed to do becomes central. A
number of factors conspire to make introspective sense of
agency tasks opaque for participants.
First, given that the sense of agency is not part of our every-
day folk psychological vocabulary (Gru¨nbaum 2015), like sensa-
tion of pain or visual experience, participants would need clear
examples in order to know what the experimenter is talking
about. Second, given the absence of an unambiguous relation to
objective stimulus conditions, it is very difficult for the experi-
menter to give clear examples illustrating the degrees of the
sense of agency and control that they are experienced in the
correct way by the participant. Third, given the absence of cor-
rect and incorrect responses when it comes to a phenomenal
sense of agency, it becomes very difficult to instruct partici-
pants in how to perform the task correctly or appropriately.
Together these factors produce a lack of experimental transpar-
ency for the participants, and it becomes very difficult to rule
out that participants are substituting the intended task (which
is hard for them to understand, due to the lack of transparency)
for some other task with which they find it easier to comply. An
easier task might in some cases be to provide a metacognitive
assessment of how certain they are that they produced some
event.
Take the following case: In the now popular experimental
paradigm by Wenke et al. (2010), an action effect (circle of a spe-
cific colour) is objectively determined by the participant’s action
(left or right key) and events preceding the action (a cue telling
the participant which action to make or a free choice cue and a
subliminal prime congruent or incongruent with respect to the
selected action). The participant has an actual but limited con-
trol over the action effects: For each action, there is a distinct
set of possible colour effects, although the specific colour is co-
determined by the identity of the subliminal prime, which is
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random with respect to the action and inaccessible to the par-
ticipants. In this paradigm, participants are asked to assess
their internal phenomenal sense of control over each colour by
using a 100-point scale ranging from ‘no control’ to ‘complete
control’.
From the perspective of the participants, this is a highly un-
usual and opaque task. The ratings in the original study by
Wenke et al. (2010) are all close to 50 (which might indicate that
participants use the scale to answer ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I can’t
judge’). The results show that the ratings are higher when the
action is not instructed but up to the participant by a relatively
small effect of only ca. 5 rating-scale points (on a 100-point
scale). However, the ratings are influenced by the (probably)
subliminal action primes, such that when the performed action
is congruent with the prime, the rating is slightly higher. The ef-
fect is small in absolute numbers (mean control rating of ca. 50
for compatible and ca. 48 for incompatible prime-action
conditions).
Given the lack of transparency of the task, the effect can be
interpreted in several ways. One interpretation could be that
the action primes led to more effortless action selection and the
smoothness of the action was behind the slightly different con-
trol ratings. This was probably not reflected consciously, be-
cause the authors asked the participants and none of them
reported having based their ratings on processing fluency, but
rather on perceived differences in colour frequencies. Another
interpretation could be that the action priming led to an illusion
of frequency differences, and this was subsequently used to
produce the control ratings, or vice versa, that the priming re-
ally led to different sense of action smoothness and this led to
the colour frequency illusion. Alternatively, a third interpreta-
tion could be that people might have been rating perceived af-
fective valence caused by the increased fluency, so that their
rating would not mean ‘I feel like a free agent’ but rather ‘this
feels nice’ (see Gru¨nbaum 2015 for discussion). Overall, since
there was no apparent objective basis for the participants’ re-
port of a feeling of control over a colour patch, we cannot rule
out that the participants substitute the given task for one they
can more easily answer. It is hard to say what exactly the partic-
ipants were rating.
Interim conclusion
The moral is this. If the experimental paradigm uses a task for
which there is no objective stimulus control and performance
measure (for instance, in terms of correct or incorrect trials), it
means that performance becomes very hard to interpret. It
becomes difficult for the participants to understand the task. In
the absence of an unambiguous relation of the phenomenal
sense of agency to an objectively controlled stimulus condition,
we cannot know whether introspective reports across trials and
across participants mean the same. In the absence of an objec-
tive performance measure, participants cannot be provided
with feedback on how well they perform the task. This sense of
opaqueness is exacerbated if the task is highly unusual, such as
the introspective rating task in the Wenke et al. (2010) study. If
the experimenters have no objective way to interpret the sub-
jective measure and participants are substituting the intended
task for some other task, then there will be no way to rule out
that the experimental design is measuring some irrelevant at-
tribute. Accepting these considerations, we believe that
researchers ought to focus their research effort on studying the
sense of agency in the ability sense.
Construct Validity
Let us end by discussing the epistemic consequences of the sit-
uation where researchers take themselves to be investigating a
single and unified construct of sense of agency but where the
experimental procedures might in fact be manipulating and
measuring several distinct constructs. The lack of correlations
of results from various experimental sense of agency proce-
dures indicates that these constructs might be relatively inde-
pendent of each other. This unacknowledged theoretical
ambiguity of the notion of sense of agency creates a situation
where the experimental procedures used in sense of agency
studies have low construct validity.
The notion of construct validity is most familiar in the field
of psychological testing. In modern test theory, ‘a test score is
valid to the extent that it measures the attribute of the respond-
ents that it is employed to measure, in the population(s) in
which it is used’ (McDonald 2013, 133). This problem of whether
a psychological measure is really measuring the phenomenon
referred to by the psychological theory is not exclusive to psy-
chometric testing. Construct validity is generally accepted as a
problem in all areas of scientific psychology, including experi-
mental psychology (Brewer 2000; Shadish et al. 2002).
Construct validity concerns the degree to which a set of pro-
cedures, results obtained using the procedures, and background
theories warrant the conclusion that a given procedure is really
investigating the psychological attributes (traits, abilities or pro-
cesses) identified by the psychological theory. The focus in this
section is the construct validity of experimental procedures (we
use the term ‘procedure’ to cover things such as experimental
design, treatment and measurement). This can be understood
as a question about, on the one hand, whether the experimental
manipulation really is manipulating the psychological attrib-
utes identified by the theory, and, on the other hand, whether
the dependent measure really is tracking the changes induced
to the attributes identified by the theory. A low degree of con-
struct validity of an experimental procedure means that we
cannot know whether the behavioural results are caused by the
manipulation of the psychological attribute, we are trying to
investigate.
It is a standard psychometric assumption that two types of
evidence are necessary to assess the construct validity of a tar-
get procedure (Campbell and Fiske 1959; Strauss and Smith
2009). First, it is necessary to establish that outcomes obtained
using the target procedure correlate with outcomes obtained us-
ing independent procedures when the various procedures have
been designed to manipulate and measure the same or closely
related attributes. Consequently, so-called ‘convergent validity’
and ‘criterion validity’ serve as evidence for construct validity
(McDonald 2013, 133). Second, the target procedure should be
significantly less correlated with outcomes of procedures that
are assumed to manipulate and measure unrelated psychologi-
cal attributes. In other words, construct validation of a target
procedure requires a contrast between, on the hand, the ‘con-
vergent’ correlational patterns obtaining between the target
procedure and alternative procedures designed to test the same
or related attributes and, on the other hand, the ‘discriminant’
correlational patterns obtaining between the target procedure
and procedures designed to test unrelated attributes (Campbell
and Fiske 1959).
It should be emphasized that caution is needed when using
psychometric correlational methods in the context of experi-
mental psychology. As it has been pointed out by several
researchers (Hedge et al. 2018), whereas psychometric measures
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are usually employed to measure individual differences (psy-
chologists would usually be interested in establishing reliable
between-subject variance), experimental procedures are usually
employed to estimate typical effects across a population (psy-
chologists would usually be interested in establishing reliable
within-subject variance). It remains an open question how to
relate these two forms of reliability (Cronbach 1957; Borsboom
et al. 2009).
Abstracting from the thorny question of how to use equiva-
lents of psychometric correlational methods in the construct
validation of experimental procedures, we will understand con-
struct validation of experimental procedures as conceptual rep-
lication: a test of a hypothesis with a given procedure or an
effect demonstrated using a given procedure repeated using dif-
ferent procedures (Schmidt 2009, 91). Of particular importance
for such a comparison would be how the relation between inde-
pendent and dependent variables correlates with the relation
between variables in the conceptually equivalent procedures.
This kind of correlational comparisons often requires that it is
possible to establish trial-by-trial comparisons.
It is important to notice that construct validation has a holis-
tic nature. Correlational patterns between the results obtained
by using different procedures serve as evidence for construct
validity. However, correlations will serve as evidence for the
claim that different procedures are targeting the same psycho-
logical attribute only if the procedures are connected in a suffi-
ciently complete and clear theoretical framework (Cronbach
and Meehl 1955). Only such a theoretical framework will allow
researchers to predict and explain the correlational patterns.
We do not have any privileged, theory neutral point of view
from which we can assess the degree to which procedures are
really manipulating the same or different attributes. All we can
do is compare the outcomes of independent procedures, given
what our theory tells us the procedures are supposed to be test-
ing. Construct validation works by incrementally and holisti-
cally improving both procedures and theory (Alexandrova and
Haybron 2016; Tal 2017).
Cognitive neuroscience of the sense of agency is challenged
both with respect to the theoretical framework and the correla-
tional pattern. As argued above, researchers do not distinguish
between the various possible constructs related to the sense of
agency. And, as we discussed, the few correlational studies that
exist do not support the claim that independent procedures tar-
get the same attribute.
Presently, the dominant computational model used to ex-
plain the sense of agency is a multifactorial weighting model
(Synofzik et al. 2008; Synofzik 2015; Moore and Fletcher 2012).
The model describes the experience of agency as having two
levels: A low-level sense of agency and a high-level judgement
about one’s agency. The low-level sense is largely the outcome
of sensorimotor processing, whereas the high-level judgement
of agency is the outcome of a cognitive integration of many
types of information (of which the low-level sense of agency is
just one).
Proponents of the multifactorial model often presuppose
that various procedures manipulate and measure a common
attribute, i.e., the sense of agency. If low-level sense of
agency serves as an input to high-level sense of agency,
then holding everything else constant we should expect
measures of low-level sense of agency (e.g. intentional bind-
ing and sensory attenuation) to be significantly correlated
with measures of high-level sense of agency (e.g. explicit
judgements of control). Consequently, the prediction of the
multifactorial weighting model is that at least some of the
various measures should be highly correlated with each
other (Beck et al. 2017).
Only few studies have explicitly attempted to correlate ex-
plicit and implicit measures of agency in order to determine
whether the two measures measure the same underlying phe-
nomenon. Given our discussion above of some of these studies,
let us here just mention one study. In Dewey and Knoblich’s
study (2014), participants performed a key press which caused a
tone after a regular interval. A sensory attenuation judgement
task (implicit measure of sense of agency) was performed,
where participants had to judge whether the tone was louder
than a reference tone. Following the sensory attenuation task,
participants had to make an explicit agency judgement on a 9-
point scale on how much they felt they produced the tones.
Dewey and Knoblich (2014) found no correlation between the
implicit measure of sensory attenuation and the explicit agency
judgements. One problem with this correlational study is that it
does not allow for a trial-by-trial comparisons of outcomes of
the different procedures. The procedures only allowed partici-
pants to give sense of agency ratings after a completed block of
trials.
The results of more recent studies are mixed. In particular, a
high-powered study by Schwarz et al. (2019) find no correlation
between implicit and explicit measures of sense of agency,
whereas Imaizumi and Tanno (2019) claimed to find trial-by-
trial correlations between binding measures and explicit agency
ratings for key press-tone experiments. Unfortunately, it cannot
be ruled out that Imaizumi and Tanno’s (2019) correlation is an
example of Simpson’s paradox (Simpson 1951), where, when
combined from multiple action-effect tasks at different delays,
a series of non-correlating measurements between implicit and
explicit measures of agency reveal a significant correlation be-
tween implicit and explicit measures.
The relationship between intentional binding and other im-
plicit measures, such as sensory attenuation, is also telling.
Dewey and Knoblich (2014) compared sensory attenuation and
binding and found no relation between sensory attenuation and
bindings, suggestion that these two procedures measure differ-
ent things. Recently, also Borhani et al. (2017) were unable to
find any significant relation. The relationship between the two
measures is complicated, to say the least. Some studies
(Schwarz et al. 2018b) have found no visual sensory attenuation
effect in highly trained action-effect relations, suggesting that it
is not a universal phenomenon, but other studies (Kilteni et al.
2019) have shown that different delays and related attenuation
effects were very adaptive. Given our two-by-two conceptual
distinction, it is not clear that these implicit procedures are ma-
nipulating and measuring the same construct. Sensory attenua-
tion procedures sometimes manipulate properties of the
movement (Blakemore et al. 1998) and sometimes action-effects
(Gentsch and Schu¨tz-Bosbach 2011).
In absence of the predicted correlations between the various
measures of the sense of agency, the epistemic situation is
muddled. There are several possible explanations of the lack of
expected correlational patterns. Let us here mention four. We
are not presuming that this list of possible explanations is
exhaustive.
First, as already indicated, one explanation might be that
whereas psychometric correlational construct validation would
normally work by looking for similarities in between-subject
variance, experimental procedures would normally gauge
within-subject variance. Making progress with the construct
validation of experimental procedures in the study of sense of
agency requires the development of paradigms that enable
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fine-grained comparisons of between-trial variance. In the ab-
sence of such comparisons, the lack of correlations between
effects of various procedures is hardly evidence of anything.
Second, a cue-integration model could insist that different
cues might be weighted differently. For instance, cues for goal-
completion might be weighted such that if the goal is com-
pleted, the agent will express a sense of agency even if the
perception-motor control is diminished (Kumar and Srinivasan
2014). The result might be that procedures gauging these differ-
ent components would lack significant correlation. In response,
it is important to remember that correlations or lack of correla-
tions is not important on their own. They become important in
the context of a theory according to which certain correlational
patterns are or are not to be expected. Given one version of the
comparator model of motor control and sense of agency, we
would expect the effect of sensory attenuation to be correlated
with the effect of intentional binding (since both effects are
explained by the same predictive mechanism). Furthermore,
given reasonable assumptions about these implicit measures
and cues used for action-recognition, we should expect inten-
tional binding to be related to explicit judgements of agency.
Third, the lack of expected correlational patterns should be
explained by faulty or noisy experimental procedures. We do
not find what we seek because our experimental procedures are
sub-optimal. And finally, fourth, the lack of expected correla-
tional patterns between implicit sense of agency procedures
and between implicit and explicit procedures is evidence that
these procedures are not manipulating and measuring a com-
mon, single attribute.
Our claim is that simply producing more data with refined
versions of old procedures will provide only little help with
clearing up this epistemically ambiguous situation. One impor-
tant aspect of this problem is the fact that dominant theories of
the sense of agency are conceptually patchy and ambiguous so
long as they do not acknowledge the four possible senses of
agency.
The consequence is low construct validity for many senses
of agency studies. Rather than targeting a common attribute,
the various procedures used to study the sense of agency might
manipulate and measure different kinds of attributes and pro-
cesses. Some procedures might measure an ability, whereas
others might measure the phenomenal strength of an experi-
ence. Furthermore, some procedures might target a bodily sense
of agency, whereas others might target an external sense. We
have no reason for thinking that these are aspects of one com-
mon construct and that the various procedures measure a com-
mon attribute. In fact, the few correlational studies that exist
could be suggesting otherwise (Dewey and Knoblich 2014; Saito
et al. 2015; Schwarz et al. 2019; Wen 2019).
Concluding Remarks
We have argued that we should acknowledge conceptual dis-
tinctions between ability vs phenomenal character and bodily
vs external forms of sense of agency. This gives us four possible
constructs. Furthermore, we argued that the conceptual distinc-
tions are mirrored by distinctions between types of experimen-
tal paradigms. The sense of agency as an ability is typically
studied by action-recognition paradigms using accuracy as a
measure, whereas the phenomenal sense of agency is typically
studied using either introspective reports or implicit measures.
The external sense of agency is typically studied in paradigms
manipulating an external event, whereas the bodily sense of
agency is studied by manipulating the self-other initiation of
the bodily movement. We argued that the majority of experi-
ments use some procedure that manipulates the external sense
of agency. Lastly, we went on to argue that due to their lack of
objectivity and transparency, it is hard to determine what para-
digms using subjective measures of phenomenal sense of
agency are really measuring.
One important reason for thinking that these different kinds
of experimental procedures are tracking different kinds of con-
structs is the absence of correlations. Results obtained using the
procedure of sensory attenuation are not correlated with results
obtained using the intentional binding procedure (Dewey and
Knoblich 2014; Borhani et al. 2017). And results using implicit
measures are not correlated with results obtained using explicit
measures (Schwarz et al. 2019). To be sure, this absence of corre-
lational evidence might just only be that: an absence of
evidence.
Summing up, we have provided reasons for accepting that a
majority of procedures target either an external ability sense of
agency or not a sense of agency at all. Without a clear picture of
which construct a given experimental procedure is manipulat-
ing and measuring, it remains impossible to test the various
competing computational models of the sense of agency.
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